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POLICY DEBATES
Powerhouse of cards? Understanding the ‘Northern
Powerhouse’
Neil Lee
ABSTRACT
Powerhouse of cards? Understanding the ‘Northern Powerhouse’. Regional Studies. The Northern Powerhouse is
the UK government’s latest attempt to reduce regional disparities. By bringing together the cities of the north into
a functional economy, the aim is to create an agglomeration with the scale to counterbalance London. This paper
summarizes and critically reviews this agenda. While sympathetic to the basic idea, it argues that the Northern
Powerhouse is a vague and problematic concept. It can be understood both as an economic development
strategy and as a political brand, giving focus to disparate and often pre-existing policies. It has meant new
resources and institutional change, but is geographically fuzzy with insufﬁcient funding to achieve its unclear
aims.
KEYWORDS
rebalancing; Northern Powerhouse; North–South divide; agglomeration
摘要
用纸牌堆砌的动力厂？ 理解“北方动力厂”，区域研究。北方动力厂 是英国政府用来降低区域差异的最新尝试。透过
将北方的城市带进功能经济，目的在于创造规模聚集来抗衡伦敦。本文摘要并批判性地回顾此一议程。本文虽然同
意该基础构想，但主张“北方动力厂” 是一个模煳且具有疑义的概念。它可被同时理解为一个经济发展策略和一项政
治宣传，关注不同且经常是既定的政策。它代表新的资源和制度变迁，但在地理上却模煳不清，且不具备充分的基
金来达成其不甚清楚的目标。
关键词
再平衡；北方动力厂；男—北分歧；聚集
RÉSUMÉ
Une force motrice ou un château de cartes? Comprendre la ‘Northern Powerhouse’. Regional Studies. La Northern
Powerhouse constitue la dernière tentative du gouvernement du R-U censer réduire les écarts régionaux. En réunissant
les grandes villes du nord en une économie fonctionnelle, le gouvernement vise à établir une agglomération dont la
taille va faire contrepoids à Londres. Ce présent article cherche à résumer et à faire la critique de ce programme. Tandis
que l’article accepte la notion fondamentale, il afﬁrme que la Northern Powerhouse n’est qu’une notion à la fois ﬂoue
et problématique. On peut l’interpréter comme une stratégie de développement économique ou une image de marque
politique, ce qui met en lumière des politiques hétérogènes, souvent préexistantes. Cela nécessite de nouvelles
ressources et une transformation institutionnelle, mais reste ﬂou sur le plan géographique, étant doté d’une
insufﬁsance de fonds pour atteindre ses objectifs peu clairs.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Kraftwerk auf tönernen Füßen? Der Hintergrund des ‘Kraftwerks des Nordens’. Regional Studies. Bei dem Kraftwerk des
Nordens handelt es sich um den jüngsten Versuch der britischen Regierung, die regionalen Disparitäten
abzuschwächen. Durch die Vereinigung der Städte des Nordens in einer funktionalen Wirtschaft soll ein Ballungsraum
mit ausreichender Größe als Gegengewicht zu London geschaffen werden. In diesem Beitrag wird dieser Plan
zusammengefasst und kritisch untersucht. Obwohl ich der Grundidee wohlwollend gegenüberstehe, argumentiere ich,
dass es sich beim Kraftwerk des Nordens um ein vages und problematisches Konzept handelt. Dieses Konzept lässt sich
sowohl als wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategie als auch als politische Marke verstehen, was verschiedenartige und
oftmals bereits früher vorhandene politische Maßnahmen in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Es führte zu neuen Ressourcen und
institutionellen Veränderungen, ist aber geograﬁsch unscharf und verfügt nicht über ausreichende ﬁnanzielle Mittel zur
Verwirklichung seiner unklaren Ziele.
SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER
Neugewichtung; Kraftwerk des Nordens; Nord-Süd-Unterschiede; Ballungsraum
RESUMEN
¿Gigante con pies de barro? Entender el proyecto ‘Central Energética del Norte’. Regional Studies. El proyecto Central
Energética del Norte es el último intento del Gobierno británico de reducir las desigualdades regionales. Mediante la
unión de las ciudades del norte en una economía funcional, se pretende crear una aglomeración de contrapeso con
una dimensión similar a la de Londres. En este artículo se resume y revisa este programa desde una perspectiva crítica.
Aunque se comparte la idea básica, se argumenta que la iniciativa ‘Central Energética del Norte’ es un concepto vago y
problemático. Se puede entender este concepto tanto como una estrategia de desarrollo económico como una marca
política, que se centra en políticas diferentes y con frecuencia ya existentes. Ha conseguido nuevos recursos y un
cambio institucional, pero es geográﬁcamente difusa con fondos insuﬁcientes para lograr unos objetivos poco claros.
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reequilibrio; ‘Central Energética del Norte’; división norte-sur; aglomeración
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INTRODUCTION
The UK has large and entrenched spatial disparities. The
latest attempt to address them is the Northern Powerhouse,
a policy agenda led by George Osborne, Chancellor of the
Exchequer. The emergence of the Northern Powerhouse
reﬂects longstanding concerns about the North–South
divide and the need for spatial rebalancing, the centralized
British state (Colomb & Tomaney, 2014), and research
highlighting the economics of agglomeration (e.g., City
Growth Commission, 2014; Glaeser, 2012; World Bank,
2009). The central idea is that if the northern English cities
were joined into a single functional economy they would
have the scale to counterbalance London. Osborne has
set out his case as follows:
Modern economists have spoken about the economic beneﬁts
when a critical mass of people, businesses and infrastructure
are brought together in a large city. The whole is then greater
than the sum of its parts. Our great northern cities rep-
resented here individually are quite small on the global
stage – but combined they rival in size London or
New York or Tokyo.
It was this opportunity to create a Northern Powerhouse
that I identiﬁed earlier this year. I said that if we can bring our
northern cities closer together – not physically, or in some
artiﬁcial political construct – but by providing modern
transport connections, supporting great science and our uni-
versities here, giving more power and control to civic govern-
ment; then we can create a Northern Powerhouse with the
size, the population, the political and economic clout, to be
as strong as any global city.
(Osborne, 2014a)
The Northern Powerhouse is a signiﬁcant agenda. It is a
spatially focused policy for national economic growth and
an explicitly interventionist approach from a traditionally
laissez-faire government. It is the latest phase in the reba-
lancing agenda (Hildreth & Bailey, 2013; Martin, Pike,
Tyler, & Gardiner, 2015), the debate about city-regions
(Harrison, 2012) and builds on calls for urban areas to be
the focus of efforts to reduce regional disparities (Overman
& Rice, 2008). The agenda has international implications:
like the 2009 World Development Report, it shows the
policy inﬂuence of agglomeration economics, and it rep-
resents the next phase of devolution in a centralized
country. It has achieved a level of interest amongst the
UK public far higher than ‘normal’ economic development
agendas. Yet the Northern Powerhouse is also a fuzzy, pro-
blematic concept. It is not a deﬁned institution or plan, but
a vague idea which has shaped government policy and pol-
itical rhetoric. Initially seen as developing from the Man-
chester model of government (Deas, 2014; Tomaney &
McCarthy, 2015), it now includes most of the North.
Powerhouse of cards? Understanding the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ 479
REGIONAL STUDIES
There are two main ways to understand the Northern
Powerhouse. The ﬁrst is that it is a strategy – a long-term
focus of policy action around a single goal. The second is
as a brand, a label which can be applied to often pre-existing
policies to give them coherence, focus and portray the gov-
ernment as acting for the North. This paper is sympathetic
to the idea that some sort of targeted attempt is necessary to
rebalance the economy: the Northern Powerhouse agenda
has certainly led to some new funding for the North. Yet
while the general concept is a good one, new resources
have been relatively limited, particularly given reductions
in ﬁnance elsewhere. Given the signiﬁcant resources
which would be needed to achieve the government’s vague
aims, it seems more like a brand ﬁrst and a strategy second.
This paper presents a review of the Northern Power-
house from its conception to the March 2016 Budget. It
is based on the evaluation of government documents and
speeches and a series of semi-structured interviews with
civil servants, researchers and an MP. It begins by setting
out the theoretical, economic and political context in
which the concept has developed. It then summarizes the
agenda as set out in both government documents and pol-
itical speeches, and considering policy on the four ‘ingredi-
ents’ Osborne has set out: transport, devolution, science
and innovation, and culture. It then considers the consider-
able fuzziness of the concept: its geography, funding, the
theoretical ambiguity of the agglomeration literature and
its relationship with existing institutions. The paper then
concludes with an evaluation of the agenda and the extent
to which it is an evidence based economic development
strategy for the North or a politically motivated branding
exercise.
THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND
THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE
NORTHERN POWERHOUSE
Economic disparities between London and the North of
England are large and growing. In 1997, London’s gross
value added (GVA) per capita grew from 157% of the
UK average in 1997 to 169% in 2013. Most northern
regions lost ground. The North West fell from 85% to
84% while Yorkshire and Humber declined from 83% to
80%. The North East’s relative performance increased,
but barely: from 72% of national GVA per capita to 73%.
This was despite a relatively favourable context: the Labour
government (until May 2010) was committed, at least rhet-
orically, to reducing regional disparities; relatively well-
resourced regional development agencies (RDAs) were
intended to reduce them, and; many expected the ﬁnancial
crisis to hit London hardest (Hutton & Lee, 2012;
Gordon, 2015; Lee, 2014).
London’s strong economic performance has been
accompanied by growing interest in the economic beneﬁts
of agglomeration. But newly inﬂuential research has pro-
vided a theoretical and empirical basis for longstanding
concerns than the northern cities could function better as
a single economic unit. Martin et al. (2015) describe two
related schools of research, the New Economic Geography
(NEG) and the New Urban Economics (NUE). Both
focus on agglomeration and the idea that the uneven distri-
bution of economic activity can be the equilibrium (and
optimum) outcome of market forces, although NEG is
more focused on rural/urban links and NUE with systems
of cities. Building on Marshall (1920) they highlight three
agglomeration economies which increase productivity with
city size: linkages between businesses; improved matching
between specialized workers and ﬁrms, and; knowledge
spillovers between economic actors.
The link between agglomeration and productivity has
become a basic tenet in policymaking. Academics such as
EdGlaeser andRichard Florida have publishedmass-market
books stressing the economic importance of cities. Govern-
ment documents have also stressed the link (e.g., Depart-
ment for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2010) as
have Osborne’s speeches on the Northern Powerhouse:
Over recent decades economists have explored all the differ-
ent reasons why cities raise their residents’ productivity:
specialisation is greater, competition and economies of scale
increase, ideas and innovation spread faster.
(Osborne, 2014b)
Empirical work has also considered the relationship
between economic mass and economic performance. In
their meta-analysis of studies quantifying agglomeration
economies, Melo, Graham, and Noland (2009) show that
agglomeration generally increases productivity, but that
the effect size varies signiﬁcantly across places. In a study
commissioned by Manchester’s local government, Over-
man, Gibbons, and Tucci (2009) show that ﬁrms in
London are more productive than those in the rest of the
country, but that those in Manchester and Liverpool out-
perform the rest of the North. The study cautiously rec-
ommended transport connections as one way of
improving productivity, where beneﬁts exceeded costs.
The Northern Powerhouse is the latest stage of the
rebalancing agenda. Based on an understanding that,
while agglomeration may matter for economic success, it
is not the only driver, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) argued that lag-
ging regions were not a ‘drag on national performance’ but
‘potential assets to be exploited’ (OECD, 2012, p. 1). For a
government seeking to raise growth rates, this represented
an opportunity. The rhetoric was clear in the 2014 Autumn
Statement, which argued that:
If the government could raise the growth rate of the north to
the projected rate for the country as a whole between now and
2030, it would add £56 billion in nominal terms to the north-
ern economy, in real terms, over £1,600 for each person living
in the north.
(HM Treasury, 2014, p. 51)
There are also political reasons why the Conservatives
would gain from a Northern focus. The Conservative
party has long been perceived as weak in the North
(McDermott & Allen, 2015). The Northern Powerhouse
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helps address this. First, it is a clear, easily understandable
message about growth in the north. Second, it provides a
‘brand’ for policies which can then be labelled as being
part of the Northern Powerhouse. These policies are vis-
ible, allowing photo-opportunities, and place based, so
well targeted. And the strategy lends itself to a sound-
bite, being simple, focused and offering a clear message.
A focus on the north also ﬁlls a political vacuum as
England lacks a regional tier of government. Under the
Labour administration of 1997–2010 ‘Regions’ were
important areas of policy. But under the Coalition, the
main regional bodies – the RDAs – were scrapped and
replaced by local enterprise partnerships (LEPs)
(McCarthy et al., 2012). This left a variety of institutions
responsible for economic development in the north, but
no strategic overview for the north as a whole. This frag-
mented structure is increasingly seen as a problem, with
high-proﬁle OECD research suggesting fragmentation
associated with lower productivity (Ahrend, Farchy, Kapla-
nis, & Lembke, 2014).
Support for devolution has been increasing for some
time. Local government in the UK has relatively little
autonomy: central government raises 95% of taxes (The
Economist, 2015). The state has been resistant to change
and the public largely indifferent: in 2004 the electorate
rejected regional assemblies; in 2012, residents in 10 of
11 cities offered a vote for elected mayors voted no.
The exception is Scotland, which received new powers
following a narrowly lost independence referendum in
2014 – leading to calls for devolution to the similarly
sized English regions (Watt, 2014). But a set of inﬂuen-
tial think-tanks – including the Centre for Cities, the
City Growth Commission from the Royal Society of
the Arts, and IPPR North – had been lobbying for devo-
lution. Political interest was also spurred by Heseltine’s
(2013) report which argued devolution would help econ-
omic growth. In this context, an old idea – that a single
northern mega-region would boost economic pro-
ductivity – returned.
‘INGREDIENTS’ OF THE NORTHERN
POWERHOUSE
The idea of a northern mega-city is not new. In 2004, Dep-
uty Prime Minister John Prescott proposed a city running
from Liverpool on the West Coast to Hull on the East
(Local Government Chronicle, 2004). These ideas were
watered down and became the Northern Way, an attempt
to develop a pan-northern growth strategy by coordinating
long-term policy interventions (Goodchild & Hickman,
2006; Liddle & Ormston, 2015). While generally seen as
successful, it had nothing like the political brand or popular
appeal of the Northern Powerhouse, and was abolished in
2010 along with the RDAs, leaving a vacuum for strategic
economic development in the north.
The term ‘Northern Powerhouse’ was ﬁrst used by
Osborne in his speech to the Manchester Museum of
Science and Industry (MOSI) on 23 June 2014. Osborne
(2014b) announced that:
The cities of the north are individually strong, but collectively
not strong enough. The whole is less than the sum of its parts.
So the powerhouse of London dominates more andmore.
And that’s not healthy for our economy. It’s not good for
our country.
We need a Northern Powerhouse too.
Not one city, but a collectionofnorthern cities– sufﬁciently
close to each other that combined they can take on the world.
The Northern Powerhouse has been a feature of govern-
ment rhetoric since and has featured in both ofﬁcial gov-
ernment documents (the 2014 Autumn Statement; 2015
Budget; combined Autumn Statement/Spending review
of 2015) and those of the Conservative party (the Conser-
vative Manifesto, 2015). A Minister, James Wharton, was
given responsibility, supported by Jim O’Neill. Four main
policy areas – termed ‘four ingredients’ by Osborne
(2014b) – lie behind the Northern Powerhouse: transport,
science and innovation, devolution and arts and culture.
Transport
Economic research on agglomeration has become increas-
ingly inﬂuential (e.g., Glaeser, 2012), and policymakers see
transport improvements as one ways of achieving it (HM
Treasury, 2010). Despite short distances there is relatively
little commuting between northern cities (HM Govern-
ment, 2015; Overman et al., 2009). As part of the agenda,
the government has invested in improved transport links,
including improved motorway capacity, new trains, tram
improvements and better rail connections. These are sig-
niﬁcant, but many commitments pre-existed the agenda:
the road commitments were set in June 2013, before
being branded as a Northern Powerhouse policy in the
2014 Autumn Statement. Other ﬁnances are not even
new money, but statutory allocations re-announced. In
the 2015 Budget the government argued that they were
spending £13 billion on new, Northern Powerhouse trans-
port investments. But the Observer newspaper reported at
least £5 billion was not new, but a standard allocation for
local areas (Boffey, 2015). A second issue here is between
intra-northern connections, which are likely to have a posi-
tive impact, and connections between the North and the
South – the beneﬁts of which may also accrue outside the
area (Tomaney & Marques, 2013). As the major scheme
linking north and south is the High Speed 2 rail line,
which predates the Northern Powerhouse, the focus here
is on connections within the north.
Published in March 2015 (the run-up to the 2015
election), the Northern Transport Strategy argued that
connections both within and between northern cities
would be important. It highlighted improvements to
commuter services, better freight transport and improved
ports. High-Speed 2 – the controversial link between the
north and London – was also included, although the
beneﬁts may not be felt in the north (Tomaney &
Marques, 2013). The major institutional reform here is
the development of Transport for the North, intended
to coordinate transport in the manner of Transport for
London.
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Science and innovation
The second area of policy has been science and innovation,
now seen as crucial ‘success factors’ for regional economies
(Perry &May, 2007). Yet funding is allocated according to
the Haldane principle that it should go to the best science,
regardless of location, leading to concerns that spending
focuses on the ‘Golden Triangle’ universities in London
and the South East. The most high proﬁle science policy
is the Sir Henry Royce Institute for Advanced Materials
Research and Innovation. This would be based in Manche-
ster with satellites in ‘cities including’ Leeds, Liverpool and
Shefﬁeld, leading to concerns (1) that the money would be
thinly spread, (2) it would be unsustainable and (3) that the
£235 million budget was low compared to the £600 million
for the Crick Institute in London, particularly given that
some money would go to southern satellite centres.
Devolution
The third ingredient has been devolution. The past 15
years has seen signiﬁcant lobbying for decentralization
from local government and other bodies (Core Cities,
2013; Marshall, Finch, & Urwin, 2006). The idea that
devolution would increase economic performance has
become a common belief (e.g., Heseltine, 2013), although
the evidence for this is weaker and more nuanced than
often portrayed (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, Tomaney, Torrisi,
& Tselios, 2012). The only city in the UK with signiﬁcant
powers is London which has had an elected mayor since
2000 and, probably coincidentally, strong economic per-
formance since. But lobbying by think-tanks and city gov-
ernments, alongside wider political moves and the
publication of the Heseltine report, had meant some
form of decentralization was always likely.
There had been moves to decentralize power under the
Coalition government of 2010–15. A Minister for Cities
was appointed and a Cities Policy Unit was established in
the Cabinet Ofﬁce – a cross-governmental body – tasked
with negotiating ‘city deals’, tailored and negotiated settle-
ments between cities and central government (Ayres &
Pearce, 2013; O’Brien & Pike, 2015). These focused on
issues such as skills or transport, although Manchester’s
included elements of ﬁscal devolution. Elected, executive
mayors are planned for major cities (some already have a
mayor, but the powers and geographical scope would
change). Civil servants see Manchester as the ﬁrst stage
in devolution processes which will then be rolled out to
other cities (Gordon, Harloe, & Harding, 2016; Tomaney,
2014). The devolution deals may have the longest legacy of
any of the recent policy changes. Yet they cannot be seen as
strictly Northern Powerhouse policies as they are not lim-
ited to the north.
Culture
The least important ‘ingredient’ has been culture. This has
only been referred to occasionally, with the controversial
but inﬂuential economic geographer Richard Florida cited:
Global cities are also great places to go out. The economist
Richard Florida has talked about the way that great cities
are competing for the ‘creative class’ that powers economic
growth. He’s shown how innovators and entrepreneurs are
attracted to creative, cultural, beautiful places.
(Osborne, 2014b)
A series of ‘trophy’ projects have been funded such as a
‘Great Exhibition in the north, the Factory Manchester –
a new theatre and exhibition space – and other arts projects
scattered across the north. But the ﬁnance has been limited:
in the 2016 Budget the government committed £19.5
million for ‘culture’ as part of the agenda. Yet at the same
time, £54 m was found for London’s Royal College of
Arts alone.
UNDERSTANDING THE NORTHERN
POWERHOUSE: STRATEGY, BRAND OR
BOTH?
While the Northern Powerhouse builds on past ideas such
as the NorthernWay, there are some important differences.
The Northern Way was less of a deﬁned brand but was run
by a single strategic institution and backed by three
Regional Development Agencies. It had its own budget
(estimated at £27 million for 2008–11; SQW, 2011), and
existed in relatively abundant times. In contrast, the
Powerhouse is a concept which – while represented by a
minister – has no single delivery body, no designated bud-
get and faces a context of falling public spending. This lack
of an administrative focus or single plan makes it hard to
pin down what the Northern Powerhouse actually is.
The Northern Powerhouse can be understood in two
ways. The ﬁrst is as a strategy, a way of setting out a
long-term vision for the north around which policy can
be focused. This is a more interventionist approach than
previous economic development policies of the Coalition,
which have used incentives to stimulate economic growth
regardless of location, rather than focusing investment on
a speciﬁc area (e.g., the New Homes Bonus provides
extra funding for councils which allow house-building).
If the Northern Powerhouse is understood as a strategy,
it has wider signiﬁcance for economic development. Firstly,
in some respects it is relatively interventionist compared to
more normal, technocratic approaches. Government
investment decisions are often made, or justiﬁed, using
economistic decision-making processes such as cost–
beneﬁt analysis. But there has been concern that this
approach is ‘biased’ against spending in the north (IPPR
North, 2012; Transport Select Committee, 2011). Simi-
larly, science and innovation spending is decided using
the Haldane principle of excellence and focuses on the
Golden Triangle. Yet there are concerns that the spatial
allocation of funding may be self-reinforcing as future
funding follows that of the past. Civil servants interviewed
for this paper suggest that the Northern Powerhouse is a
way of taking a strategic view of economic development
and letting politicians overrule approaches based on econ-
omic evaluation principles. It is important to caveat this
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argument, and the bulk of recent policy has been of a more
standard approach. But, despite his reputation as a laissez-
faire Chancellor, Osborne has made this interventionist
argument himself:
For decades different governments tried shifting lower end
public sector posts around the country. It created jobs in
call centres and back ofﬁces, but it didn’t improve the funda-
mental growth potential of these places.
Leaving it all to the market doesn’t work either. The
Albert Dock in Liverpool or Manchester City Centre
didn’t regenerate themselves. It took national leaders like
Michael Heseltine and civic leaders like Richard Leese and
that brilliant star of city government, Howard Bernstein.
(Osborne, 2014b)
The second implication is that the Northern Powerhouse is
an example of an explicitly spatial economic growth strat-
egy, similar to the ‘growth poles’ in the 1960s and 1970s
(Richardson, 1976). In particular, it reﬂects older argu-
ments about whether policy should focus on people or
places (e.g., Crowley, Balaram, & Lee, 2012; Hildreth &
Bailey, 2013), with a strategy which is apparently based
on urban economics but also draws on place-based models.
Thirdly, the Northern Powerhouse represents the evol-
ution of the Manchester Model of local government
(Tomaney & McCarthy, 2015). Stable and focused local
leadership has accompanied a series of attempts to simplify
local government in the area: from the Association of
Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) in 1986, the
Greater Manchester Combined Authority in 2011, to the
eventual signing of a city deal in 2012 (Tomaney &
McCarthy, 2015). The city government developed a repu-
tation for being easy to deal with and efﬁcient, with a net-
work of hard and soft institutions developing (Deas, 2014).
Interviewees saw this institutional development as crucial
for Manchester’s success in lobbying for new powers.
Finally, the Northern Powerhouse represents a cross-
government piece of policy making. The importance of
cross-departmental efforts has been a long-term theme in
British urban policy (Robson, 1994), with urban problems
seen as requiring intervention from many agencies. The
agenda has involved efforts from across Whitehall along-
side local authorities and other actors. Being led by the
Treasury helped:
The Northern Powerhouse is a cross-governmental effort. No
one else, probably even the PM, could make that happen.
Only the Treasury and the Cabinet Ofﬁce have that cross
government focus.
(senior BIS ofﬁcial)
However, the Northern Powerhouse also serves a second,
important function as a brand: a political tool used to per-
suade a suspicious electorate that the Conservatives care
about the north. The ‘policy’ has some features which
lend it to this interpretation: it is a good sound-bite; it is
vague enough for individuals to interpret in their own
way, yet speciﬁc enough for them to feel they have
understood; it is focused and clear; and it is hard to oppose.
For political messaging purposes it is excellent. As William
Hague, one of the few eminent Northern Conservatives has
argued:
The clearest, most coherent thing for the north of England is
the Northern Powerhouse initiative offered by the Conserva-
tive party. It’s the clearest, most purposeful initiative we’ve
had in the north for decades.
(William Hague, cited in The Economist, 2015)
If this interpretation is correct, the ‘brand’ can simply be
applied to give existing policies focus and comprehension.
New motorways, enterprise zones and so on can all be
branded as Northern Powerhouse projects – lending coher-
ence to scattered policy initiatives and increasing ‘brand
awareness’.
There have been similar attempts to ‘brand’ policy
agendas in the past. The most notable is similarly fuzzy,
the Big Society (Bailey & Pill, 2011). Deﬁned in the
2015 Conservative Manifesto (2015, p. 45) as ‘a vision of
a more engaged nation, one in which we take more respon-
sibility for ourselves and our neighbours; communities
working together, not depending on remote and imperso-
nal bureaucracies’. Despite a favourable initial reaction to
the concept, it was hard to reconcile with cuts and is now
rarely used (Butler, 2015).
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive
and the Northern Powerhouse may be both strategy and
brand. It represents an attempt at addressing several old
problems in British urban policy, building on previous
measures and developing a powerful brand. But the fuzzi-
ness of the concept, its lack of stated aims, and a lack of
resources (or at least clarity about them) mean that the
Northern Powerhouse has some signiﬁcant limitations.
FUZZY POLICY
The Northern Powerhouse is a policy agenda based around
an important idea: the inﬂuence of agglomeration in the
economy. It is not an institution or a strategic plan with
a deﬁned, codiﬁed remit. This fuzziness leads to some
important problems with the agenda, including a geo-
graphical fuzziness, vagueness about leadership and
responsibility, drift from the theoretical ideals and unclear
ﬁnancing.
Fuzzy geography and competition for resources
The implicit focal point of the Northern Powerhouse is
Manchester, where Osborne gave his ﬁrst speech on the
topic. Manchester is the archetypal resurgent city in the
UK, beneﬁting from stable government, relatively well-
funded regeneration and the relocation of the BBC
(Gordon et al., 2016). Manchester was central to the
‘deal-making’ process of devolution, where cities worked
with central government to develop tailored devolution
deals (Ayres & Pearce, 2013). It plays an important
economic role in the north (Deas, 2014; Taylor, Hoyler,
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Evans, & Harrison, 2010). Yet it is hard to deﬁne func-
tional regions and link them with government structures
(Coombes, 2014), and focusing on one agglomeration
means excluding other places (Harrison & Healey,
2015). So the geographical scope of the ‘Northern
Powerhouse’ has never been clearly deﬁned. This raises
a set of questions.
First, how many, and what sort, of areas can become
‘Powerhouses’? Other places have tried to use similar
terms. For example, Cornwall has lobbied for powers to
become the ‘South Western Powerhouse’ (Langston,
2015). The Conservative 2015 Manifesto committed to
making the Midlands the ‘Engine of Growth’. So the
West Midlands also received a devolution deal (HM
Treasury & West Midlands Combined Authority, 2015).
But the spreading of devolution deals undermines the
idea that they are speciﬁc to the Northern Powerhouse.
Moreover, this form of lobbying for resources is rarely
about the initial ‘Powerhouse’ concept of a large agglomera-
tion (Cornwall is a peripheral rural area). Instead, it is a
pitch for resources or the devolution deals which are
being rolled out across the UK (Bentley & Pugalis,
2013), but which have been sold as part of the Northern
Powerhouse. It has been impossible to sustain a geographic
focus: in 2015’s Summer Budget, the Northern Power-
house was accompanied by measures to support growth
in the Midlands, East of England, South West and even
London.
A second question is what the geographical extent of
the Northern Powerhouse should be. In the 2015 Autumn
Statement, the Northern Powerhouse was deﬁned as being
about making ‘the cities of the north a powerhouse’ (HM
Treasury, 2014, p. 49). ‘And crucially, it should be at a
pan-Northern level, to create a single economy across the
North’ (HMGovernment, 2015, p. 4). But this geographi-
cal spread contradicts the initial idea that resources should
be targeted geographically. And the focus on Manchester
has been criticized: following the 2014 Budget the Guar-
dian complained that it provided ‘Yet more goodies for
Greater Manchester.’ It has been hard for policymakers
to focus resources on agglomerations when confronted
with objections from elsewhere. Moreover, there is a clear
theoretical tension: the agglomeration theories which
apparently inspired the Powerhouse suggest that disparities
are likely to persist. The idea that every city can be a
‘Powerhouse’ contradicts this.
Fuzzy aims
The lack of geographical clarity stems from another funda-
mental issue: the agenda’s vague aims. It is unclear whether
the Northern Powerhouse is about ensuring gains across
the whole of the North, or an attempt to ﬁnd somewhere
in the north with the potential to address the North–
South divide. The coalition government’s focus had pre-
viously been on realizing ‘every place’s’ economic potential
(Hildreth & Bailey, 2013). But this is incompatible with
theory on agglomeration, which suggests disparities are
inevitable, and the policy focus on Manchester.
When the goals of the Northern Powerhouse have been
set out, they have been ambitious. David Cameron argued
that:
what I am pledging here is nothing less than the most impor-
tant commitment to the north for decades: we’re going to
close the north–south gap.
(Cameron, quoted in Rigby and Bounds, 2015)
And the Conservative manifesto suggested it was part of
their goal to:
raise the growth rate of all parts of England, bringing areas
which have grown more slowly up to at least the national
average.
(Conservative Party, 2015, p. 11)
But for this to happen requires more than a focus on Man-
chester. Yet there is no clear target for the Northern
Powerhouse.
Fuzzy theory
While overtly inspired by the insights of NEG or NUE,
the Northern Powerhouse has drifted considerably from
the theory. NEG/NUE models consider the spatial focus
of growth. But, the paradox of these apparently geographi-
cal NEG/NUE type models is that they lead to a policy mix
of spatially blind policies (such as education) with infra-
structure linking successful and less successful local econ-
omies, and spatially targeted interventions only later
(Hildreth & Bailey, 2013; Tomaney, 2014). Hildreth and
Bailey (2013) argue that the famous World Development
report of 2009 suggested that ‘growth and development
by its very nature will be unbalanced and that efforts to
spread economic activities will be counter-productive in
undermining growth and prosperity’.
But the Northern Powerhouse sits uneasily with this.
NEG/NUE models show the role of agglomeration in
regional disparities, and their link with the Northern
Powerhouse has been explicit in Osborne’s speeches. Yet
these theories are intended to explain disparities, rather
than provide solutions to them. The Northern Powerhouse
actually mixes different types of development policy. Barca
(2011, p. 217) sets out a typology of local economic devel-
opment policy. At ﬁrst glance, the Northern Powerhouse
reﬂects his ‘agglomeration-driven approach’, with public
investments used to enable agglomeration and the market
deciding which places ultimately beneﬁt. However, of the
four ‘ingredients’, only transport really reﬂects the NEG/
NUE type theory on which it was based. Instead, many
of the policies cited derive from what Barca (2011, p.
219) calls the ‘place-based approach’, where resources
under-utilization in less developed regions is a concern
and policy considers spatial factors. The devolution pro-
cesses underway, in which local areas tailor a package of
interventions, might fall into this category. But there is
also a strong element of ‘Communitarian’ policy, where
development is driven by ‘local agents’ awareness of their
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own knowledge and preferences’ (pp. 219). The devolution
deals can be seen partly in this light.
Fuzzy empirics
Improved transport links in the north are likely to have a
positive impact on the economy. But the beneﬁts will not
be large on a per capita basis, pay little attention to the
cost of interventions and are unlikely to achieve the stated
policy aims. In a report for the Northern Way, Overman
et al. (2009) investigate the potential economic beneﬁts
of transport improvements:
a 20 minute reduction in train journey times between Man-
chester and Leeds would be worth £6.7 billion across the
whole of the north of England (assuming beneﬁts persist
indeﬁnitely) of which £2.7 billion is captured within the
two city regions.
(Overman et al., 2009, p. 13)
But once considering these as a percentage of overall output,
the gains from improving rail links are relatively small
(Overman et al., 2009, p. 13). The major impact would
work through long term structural change (i.e., upgrading
sectors) – with no guarantee existing residents would
beneﬁt: ‘greater integration would deliver no wage growth
beneﬁts to people who do not change education or skills
levels.’ Similarly, Gibbons (2015) undertakes some ‘back
of the envelope calculations’ on Greater Manchester,
where he suggests a new transport scheme increasing Man-
chester’s labour market by 60,000 workers would add
around £2.9 billion to GVA. These are signiﬁcant sums,
but nothing like the scale of disparities between north
and south.
Moreover, it is not clear that the focus on transport
addresses the main cause of regional disparities: some
argue the main determinant of disparities is the education
and skills levels of the population (Gibbons, Overman, &
Pelkonen, 2014). Yet early Northern Powerhouse
announcements contained no policy measures around edu-
cation and skills, an omission only later rectiﬁed in the
2016 budget with a small investment in schools in the
North, the announcement that a review of northern school
quality would take place and an agreement to move towards
devolution of adults skills funding.
Fuzzy ﬁnances
A ﬁnal, related concern is the scale of funding. One test of
whether the Northern Powerhouse represents a genuine
economic development strategy, rather than a political
brand, are the ﬁnances devoted to it. Yet the funding
arrangements are opaque. There are three possible routes
for funding for projects announced as part of the Northern
Powerhouse. Money can be new, coming from new tax rev-
enues or freed up elsewhere. This is the clearest evidence
that the government is prioritizing the Powerhouse, but
near impossible to identify. Alternatively, money may be
refocused from other spending into projects labelled as
part of the Powerhouse (for example, if government science
spending was purposely moved from the south to the
north). But it is impossible to tell if money is new or refo-
cused, and in both cases there will be an opportunity cost,
particularly if the money is spent for political reasons.
Finally, the money might be existing, pre-planned commit-
ments simply rebadged with the Powerhouse label.
There is no single government document outlining all
Northern Powerhouse spending commitments. Table 1
considers some of the key commitments attributed to the
agenda in government documents (the Autumn Statement
2014, the two Budgets of 2015, the 2015 Spending
Review/Autumn Statement, and the 2016 budget).
Figures are murky, and it is not always clear what is new
money as opposed to ﬁnances already committed. Overall,
without including High Speed 2 or 3 and excluding money
already committed and obviously relabelled, around £6.7
billion has been committed as transport spending, repre-
senting the bulk of around £7.8 billion committed. Yet
even here, the very charitable upper bound estimate of
£6.7 billion new money is less than half the £14.8 billion
ﬁnance spent on Crossrail, a new rail scheme for London
(HM Treasury, 2010), and it is dwarfed by the £27 billion–
£32 billion cost of the proposed follow-up, Crossrail 2
(Crossrail 2, 2016).
It is harder to assess spending commitments made
through devolution deals, and so these are not covered.
The devolution deal for Manchester – the Greater Man-
chester Agreement – included some new funding. Civil
servants interviewed for this paper gave a rough ﬁgure of
£4.2 billion for the 5 devolution deals announced between
the May election and November 2015. But this ﬁgure is for
30 years and £1.2 billion of that is Birmingham, in the
Midlands.
Spending as part of the Northern Powerhouse is a mix-
ture of new, refocused and rebadged funding. Some fund-
ing has simply been branded as a ‘Powerhouse’ initiative
even thought pre-existed the term. For example, in the
2014 Autumn Statement the government argued that
they were ‘providing £10 million to support the expansion
of the very best academy chains in areas of the north’ (HM
Treasury, 2014, p. 51). But this is unrelated to the initial
idea of the Northern Powerhouse, and was actually a
national scheme which had been underway since 2010.
Similarly, funding was announced for the National Gra-
phene Institute in the 2012 Budget. It was then re-
announced in Osborne’s 2014 Northern Powerhouse
speech and once again in the 2015 Budget.
But some funding is either new or at least refocused.
The Sir Henry Royce Institute for Materials Research is
an example. £235 million funding for the centre was
announced in the 2014 Autumn Statement. Interviews
suggest this was an example of ﬁnance being available
and then a political choice made to invest it in the Northern
Powerhouse rather than elsewhere. It was inspired by the
work of the N8 – a group of the eight leading northern
research universities – on the ‘strengths of the north’ and
through a roundtable held with business leaders. But this
was one of many asks from northern leaders to Whitehall,
and the only one acted upon – a case of lobbying from
northern institutions rather than local ﬁnancial freedoms.
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Table 1. Key spending commitments as part of the Northern Powerhouse.
Theme Estimated cost
1. Transport (not including High Speed 2)
Northern Hub Rail £530 million
Northern Road Investment Packagea £4 billion
Electriﬁcation and rail investmenta £1.65 billion
Transport for North – money for smart ticketing £150 million
Transport for North – operational ﬁnance £50 million
Regional Air Connectivity Fund £7 million
Finance to develop plans for High Speed 3 (Leeds–Manchester route) £60 million
Upgrading of M62 to four-lane, smart motorway £161 million
Development of business case for trans-Pennine tunnel and road upgrading £75 million
High Speed 2 growth strategies £4 million
Approximate total spending committed (excluding High Speed 2/High Speed 3 rail lines) £6.69 billion
2. Science and innovation
Sir Henry Royce Centre for Material Researchb £235 million
High-value manufacturing catapult in Sedgeﬁeld £28 million
Sovereign Wealth Fund for North (funding not yet committed) n.a.
Continuation funding for the National Nuclear Users Facility £60 million or £250 million
Expansion of best academy schools in Northc £10 million
Northern Powerhouse Schools Strategy £20 million
Health North investment £20 million
National Institute for Smart Data Innovation £15 million
Advanced Wellbeing Research Centre in Shefﬁeld (Part of Olympic Legacy Park) £14 million
Tech Incubators in the North £11 million
Shefﬁeld Maker Hub £3.5 million
Leeds Future Lab/Financial technology incubator £3.7 million
Manchester Forward Plan £4 million
Extra funding for Centre for Process Innovation in chemicals sector £1 million
Extend Enterprise Zones in North £15 million
National Graphene Institute/Graphene Engineering Innovation Centre (GEIC) £45 million
Anti-microbial resistance centre of excellent £4 million
Northern Powerhouse Trade Missions £15 million
Northern Powerhouse Investment Taskforce £7 million
Approximate total spending committed (excluding Northern Powerhouse Investment Fund) £511 million–701 million
3. Arts and culture
Great Exhibition in the North £5 million
Great Exhibition Legacy Fund £15 million
Manchester Museum’s South Asia Gallery £5 million
Hull City of Culture £13 million
Support for Rugby League World Cup (funding level not yet announced) n.a.
The Factory, Manchester £78 million
Arts Project for WWI £3 million
Refurbished Muni Theatre in Pendle £56,000
Reinstated Norway Ferry/Marketing £300,000
Shakespeare North theatre project £5 million
Tour de Yorkshire funding £500,000
S1 Artspace funding (subject to planning) £1 million
Total arts and culture spending £126 million
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CONCLUSIONS: POWERHOUSE OF
CARDS?
At the heart of the Northern Powerhouse is an important
idea: the potential economic beneﬁts if the cities of North-
ern England worked as a larger functional economic area.
This is not a new idea, but the latest iteration has the high-
est proﬁle yet. The Northern Powerhouse agenda has
focused efforts on the north and led to some new invest-
ment, although the scale of new ﬁnance has been overstated
by repeated re-announcements. There has been some insti-
tutional change, such as Transport for the North, and this
may have a long-lasting impact. In this respect, it is a gen-
uine attempt to rebalance the UK economy with a basis in
academic research and some new resources.
But the Northern Powerhouse has drifted signiﬁcantly
from the initial concept and has become an increasingly
fuzzy agenda. Part of the reason is that the Northern
Powerhouse is also a powerful political brand. The lack
of strategic clarity, deﬁned plan or accountable institution,
the creeping geographical remit and the relatively limited
ﬁnances available for such an ambitious goal all lend sup-
port to this interpretation. The original idea was about
creating a functional urban area, but the policy is now
used as a generic brand for government policy in the
north. Many initiatives labelled as part of the Northern
Powerhouse are not even exclusive to the north.
There are two important contextual factors which will
limit the success of the agenda. The ﬁrst is that the Power-
house agenda has – as yet – only limited focus on education
and skills. Some policy, around universities or culture, may
help in this area, and the 2016 budget did include limited
measures to improve the quality of northern schools. The
skills of the population are probably the most important dri-
ver of disparities across the UK (Gibbons et al., 2014), so it is
strange that this is notmore of a focus of policy. Secondly, the
Northern Powerhouse provides small sums as large cuts are
simultaneously made to local government spending. More-
over, there are concerns that future ﬁscal devolution will
reduce the ﬁnances available for cities in the north further.
While there are positive aspects to theNorthern Powerhouse
agenda, this context will reduce its chances of success.
A benchmark of government commitment to the
Northern Powerhouse is the amount of new money.
There are examples of new spending (such as the Sir
Henry Royce Centre). But much is existing projects
being rebranded (the Graphene Research Institute), pre-
existing statutory budgets (some roads spending) or trivial
(ﬁnances to commemorate the First World War). If
Osborne is really trying to ‘close the north–south gap’
then the resources provided are clearly insufﬁcient. The
Northern Powerhouse is a clever piece of politics, given
spending constraints. But where there is too little substance
this creates a reputational risk for the concept itself – if used
solely as a political brand, it will become devalued.
This raises the concern that a strong, evidence based
initial concept has become a political exercise rather than
a genuine attempt at rebalancing the economy. By raising
expectations without providing resources or a genuine lea-
dership structure risks a collapse of the concept the deva-
luation of the brand (a ‘powerhouse of cards’). The Big
Society – an earlier policy and/or branding exercise – was
similarly affected. However, there will be one potential
consequence of applying such a memorable brand to a set
of policy measures. As the government now has a high pro-
ﬁle agenda around rebalancing of the economy, the result
may be to make the government at least partly accountable
for the further widening of the north–south divide.
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